The regulation of hunting: A game population based tax on hunters

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Abildtrup, Jens | Jensen, Frank

Edité par Ivry : Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique ; PERSÉE : CNRS & ENS de Lyon -

Cet article examine une taxe/subvention basée sur la population de gibier à destination des chasseurs. La taxe/subvention est la différence entre la population observée et optimale multipliée par un taux de taxation individuel et variable. Le taux de taxe est, entre autres choses, basé sur la différence entre la valeur marginale de la population de gibier pour le chasseur et pour le régulateur et sur les différences dans la valeur virtuelle d’une unité du stock de gibier. L’article montre que la taxe/ subvention basée sur les populations de gibier assure un optimum de premier rang.. This paper examines a tax/subsidy on hunters based on game population. The tax/subsidy is the difference between actual and optimal population multiplied by an individual, variable tax rate. The tax rate is, among other things, based on the difference between the marginal value of the game population to the hunter and the regulator and differences in user costs of the population. The paper shows that the population tax/subsidy secures a first-best optimum.. Abildtrup Jens, Jensen Frank. The regulation of hunting: A game population based tax on hunters. In: Revue d’études en Agriculture et Environnement, Vol. 95, N°3, 2014. pp. 281-298.

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