The blockchain folk theorem

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Biais, Bruno | Bisière, Christophe | Bouvard, Matthieu, | Casamatta, Catherine

Edité par CCSD ; Oxford University Press (OUP) -

International audience. Blockchains are distributed ledgers, operated within peer-to-peer networks. We model the proof-of-work blockchain protocol as a stochastic game and analyze the equilibrium strategies of rational, strategic miners. Mining the longest chain is a Markov perfect equilibrium, without forking, in line with Nakamoto (2008). The blockchain protocol, however, is a coordination game, with multiple equilibria. There exist equilibria with forks, leading to orphaned blocks and persistent divergence between chains. We also show how forks can be generated by information delays and software upgrades. Last we identify negative externalities implying that equilibrium investment in computing capacity is excessive

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